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I -- Introduction 
Monetary policy rules with various complexities have a long history dating back to the gold 
standard. In recent years, due to empirical findings that central bank's independence and inflation 
are negatively correlated (Cukierman, 1992, chapter 20), central banks have been given greater 
independence from political authorities (Maxfield 1993, p. 3). At the same time, due to the 
successes and failures of central bankers around the world in recent years in controlling prices, 
we have witnessed an upsurge of interest among monetary analysts in discussing monetary rules 
-- simple, explicit and flexible rule-- for monetary policy. As a result of the recent studies two 
rules have emerged as guideline for policy makers: Taylor rule and McCallum rule.  
Taylor rule requires the central bankers to adjust the nominal interest rate in response to the 
observed or predicated values of inflation rate and the percentage difference between actual 
output and its full-employment trend value (potential or capacity GDP). McCallum rule requires 
the monetary authorities to set the monetary base in reaction to the changes in the nominal GDP, 
average growth rate in the base velocity of money, and the deviation in the actual GDP and its 
potential level.  
In section II of this chapter, literature related to various aspects of a simple, explicit, and flexible 
monetary rule for monetary stability will be provided. Since in the Iranian economy, interest 
rates are administratively set and are not, by and large, a reflection of market conditions, Taylor 
rule may not be a viable option. As a result, in section III only findings based on the McCallum 
rule simulations will be presented. In final section, summery and conclusions will be provided. 
II -- Monetary rule versus discretion 
Over the last few decades, one issue that has been the centerpiece of discussion and occupied a 
great deal of attention among the academics and central bankers pertains to the merits of 
monetary rules verses monetary discretion. Henry Simon (1936) and Milton Friedman (1960) 
spearheaded this discussion in modern times. Friedman argued that the length and variability of 
lags in the effects of monetary policy make it rather impossible for policy makers to consistently 
perform their duties in setting monetary goals for economic stabilization, growth, and 
development. Therefore, he suggested using a fixed monetary rule consistent with a certain level 
of growth in the nominal income as the most preferred modus operandi for the central bank. 
However, the socio-political-economic environment of the time put monetarism at odds with the 
prevailing mainstream theory that believed in the existence of a Phillips curve relationship where 
the central bankers could manipulate the interest rates to achieve some sort of balance between 
the inflation and the unemployment rates. This prompted a multi-pronged empirical and 
theoretical research on the subject. Tanner (1969) and Hamburger (1971) devoted much attention 
to the lag structure of monetary policy while Tucher (1966), Howrey (1969), Moore (1963), 
Svensson (1999), McCallum (1987 and 2000), Taylor 1993 and 1999) Stuart (1996) spent much 
of their analysis on different theoretical and empirical issues related to rules versus discretion in 
monetary policy.  
IIa -- Rules: A Monetarist Utopia! 
The monetarists, led by Milton Friedman, Anna Schwartz, Karl Brunner, Allan Meltzer, and 
many others from Chicago school and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis which have become 
bastions of monetarism, engaged in empirical studies that provided support for the quantity 
equation and the neutrality of money. In this process they showed that the demand for money 
(income velocity of money) to be very stable. As a result, they argued, any instability that arise 
would be due to excess money supply relative to the real output which is determined by the 
growth in the population, capital stock, and productivity. This delivered a hard blow at the heart 
of the prevailing economic theories that supported the existence of the Phillips curve trade off 
and economic activism at the time. That is, it implicated monetary activism in destabilization of 
the economy. It is the short run changes in the money supply rather than the inherent instability 
in the real sector of the economy, they maintained, that causes output and employment to deviate 
from their long-term trends. Therefore, in order to mitigate and shorten these deviations from the 
desired long-term trends, monetarists suggested that a monetary policy rule would be more 
advisable and preferable to monetary policy discretion. Accordingly, if we adopt a rule, there 
would be less uncertainty with regard to the future of monetary policy and people would not 
engage in speculations that are wasteful and inefficient.  
IIb --Rules versus activism 
 The issue of rules versus discretion has also been discussed within the context of rules 
versus activism. Activists have argued that rules which, most of the time assumed to be rigid and 
mechanical, do not allow for unwelcome variations in the economic activities over business 
cycles. Therefore, they argue, as new information about the economy becomes available, policy 
makers must have the flexibility (discretion) to adjust their policy tools to correspond with new 
realities.  
An argument against the necessity of discretion is the uncertainly that policy changes would have 
on private decision-makers. They must spend time and energy and try to read the "tea leaves" 
and extract the future course of action by the monetary authorities and undertake their own 
course of actions, knowing they could very well be wrong. This would lead to less than optimum 
decisions on their part.  
The argument against rules hinges on the assumption that the rule must be observed which leaves 
not room to maneuver for the monetary authorities. At least the newer generation of rules 
advocates propose a reaction function that policy makers could employ which takes the new 
information into consideration and responds to the new environment within the prescribed rules 
of the game. That is, there is room for discretion within the confines of the set rules. 
  
  
IIc -i- Policy changes: do they matter? 
Economists have been discussing and evaluating alternative monetary and exchange rate regimes 
in terms of their theoretical and empirical efficacy, appropriateness, and their desirability in 
achieving certain targets and thence some economic goal(s) for a long time. This is a result of the 
policy makers desire to protect or insulate the economy from internal and external-- real and 
monetary -- shocks or direct it toward what is considered to be the proper destination. Choosing 
a tool is, therefore, sensitive and open to questions on several grounds. On one level, the 
instrument must necessarily be observable, measurable, controllable, and have a very tight 
association with the target and/or the goal. This requires solid theoretical as well as empirical 
foundations to guide us. On another level, we need to be sensitive to the argument that fiscal and 
monetary authorities do not have a significant role to play, at least in the long run, in determining 
or affecting the real sector of the economy. That is, people would adjust their behavior to counter 
policy variations and hence nullify any attempt to influence the economy in one way or another. 
Here, therefore, we have uncertainty on the part of the policy makers as well as private decision-
makers. Private individuals must guess the policy-makers' behavior while policy-makers must 
guess the reaction of the private individuals to the new information and policies. We have a 
conundrum that require a great deal more empirical research on the behavior of the private 
individuals or reduce private decision-makers' uncertainly by avoiding shocks to the system 
through policy changes. It is important to recognize the fact that uncertainty could not be 
eliminated, policy-makers could only reduce it.  
IIc -i- Recent developments: the monetary response (feedback) rules 
The monetary feedback rules, first suggested by McCallum (also referred to as a loss function or 
McCallum rule), breathed a new life into the monetary rule that had been suggested by Milton 
Friedman. The main objection to Friedman's rule was its rigidity. It was attacked as being 
mechanical and risky because it could not account for variations in the velocity of money and 
therefore, it was judged to be unsuitable for policymaking. In contrast, these "new rules" link the 
controllable rates of interest such as the federal fund rate or a monetary aggregate such as the 
monetary base to deviations of the nominal GDP or inflation rate from their target values. So, the 
central bank uses whatever information they have available to ascertain the state of the economy 
and whether or not the inflation rate, unemployment rate, or nominal GDP are at or close to their 
desired trends. If they were not, then the central bank would respond by changing the interest 
rates or the monetary reserves.  
These models assume, in general, that the central banks have or should have an explicit or 
implicit target inflation rate that could be achieved by following these rules. These models also 
assume that monetary policy does not have a long run affect on the real sector of the economy, 
i.e., on unemployment rate, output, etc. However, in the shorter run, there is a Phillips curve 
trade-off and therefore, monetary policy in not neutral in the short run.  
  
IId -ii-Interest Targeting: Taylor rule:  
Rt = δ + ∆ π a + 0.5 (∆ π a-π e) +0.5 (Ya -Y*)   (1) 
In this specification, the real interest rate, Rt, is explained by the real interest rate, δ ; the inflation 
gap (the deviation of the current inflation rate, ∆ π a, from the targeted rate, π e); and the output 
gap (the deviation of the rate of growth in the nominal output, ya, from the targeted rate, y*). 
This rule shows that when the economy is in equilibrium, (π a = π e) and (Ya =Y*), then the rate 
of interest is at its long run level. On the other hand if Ya and/or π a are greater or less than their 
target values, (π e, Y*), interest rates must be increased or deceased, respectively to nudge the 
economy back toward equilibrium. 
This specification has its advantages and disadvantages. It is more realistic in countries where 
there is a reasonably active and market oriented bond market and the central bank use some 
nominal interest rate as their instrument or operating target. This, however, is not relevant to a 
country like Iran where fiat rather than the market set interest rates. It is also shown (Taylor, 
1993) that western central banks do follow some sort of interest rate targeting in their monetary 
policies. The shortcoming of this rule is the need for contemporaneous information about income 
at time t to set interest rates for time t. Also, a rule must be changed rather infrequently and that 
is not the case for interest rate targeting.  
IId -iii-Monetary Base Targeting: McCallum Rule: 
McCallum's Rules 
∆ Bt = ∆ Yt* - ∆ Vta - λ (∆ Yt*- ∆ Yt-1*)      (2) 
McCallum's Specification relates change in the log of monetary base (growth rate of the 
monetary base, ∆ B) to the change in the log of nominal GDP, ∆ Y*, the average growth rate of the 
velocity of the monetary base, ∆ Va , and finally, a feedback mechanism that relays the deviation 
of the nominal GDP from its desired level in the previous period, ∆ Yt*-∆ Yt-1*. Average growth 
rate of the velocity over a three year period is defined as Vt = (Yt - Bt). This term is expected to 
capture changes in the demand for monetary base due to permanent technological or structural 
shifts (such as the 1979 revolution or the Islamicization of banking) rather than cyclical 
variations. Value of λ determines the speed of adjustment in the monetary base (the instrument). 
High values of λ imply complete adjustment of the instrument to deviations of the target variable 
from its long run path and low values imply partial or slower response to the deviations. 
Therefore, the value of λ depends on the tolerance of the policy makers to deviations of the 
target from its path, i.e., how long could they allow the value of the target variable to go and stay 
above or below its preset levels. High tolerance of these deviations means low values of λ and 
low tolerance means high values for λ . The level of λ and policy makers' tolerance of deviations 
also determines the frequency of adjustment in the instrument. High tolerance of deviations, 
therefore, means low λ and less frequent adjustment in the instrument. While low tolerance 
implies high values of λ and hence more frequent adjustment in the instrument. 
 The choice of the monetary base as the instrument is analogous to the choice of price 
versus quantity. You could not control both the price and quantity without creating shortages or 
surpluses in the market. Here, we also need to be cognizant of another important factor in 
choosing the monetary instrument. The choice of monetary base rather than other monetary 
aggregates such as the money supply M1 or M2 is based, in principle, on the controllability of the 
instrument, monetary base, Meltzer (1969). The central bank could collect information on the 
monetary base very frequently, say daily, if not hourly. An advantage that is not feasible for 
other monetary aggregates such as the money supply. Also, monetary base has a very high 
correlation with the nominal GDP. Therefore since the central bank has a greater short term and 
long term control over the monetary base and it has high correlation with the target variable, 
nominal income, it is a better candidate as the monetary instrument.  
It is important to note that, based on either theoretical or empirical available tools, we have no 
way of convincingly dividing the growth in the nominal GDP into real growth and inflation. 
However, since the real output grows according to the growth in factors of production, a steady 
growth in the nominal output, say 3% or 5% a year or, whatever is historically achievable for the 
economy in real terms, would not leave much room for inflation. Accordingly, a steady 3% or 
5% growth in the nominal GDP would minimize both inflationary potentials as well as business 
cycle fluctuations.  
III-- Empirical results of McCallum rule 
IIIa-- The data: All of the data were downloaded from the International Monetary Funds' 
financial statistics CDs. Missing values were obtained from the Iran Statistical Yearbooks. As is 
the case for all aggregate data, most Iranian time series are subject to stationarity problem. 
Before the simulation of the model, each of the variables of the model was tested for stationarity. 
It seems, according to the Dickey-Fuller and Perron's unit root tests, for the most parts, rates of 
changes in the log of variables are stationary at least by one of the tests. Below are the results:  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips Perron Unit Root Tests 
Variable name ADF statistic PP 
statistic 
DLCPI =change in the log of Consumer Price Index -4.44a -3.7b 
DLEXPP = change in the log of exports revenues -6.47a -8.46a 
DLIMPP = change in the log of imports price index -2.63c -2.25* 
DLMRES = change in the log of monetary reserves -2.95b -4.62a 
DLY = change in log of Gross Domestic Product (GDP -3.15* -3.63b 
DLYSTAR = change in the log of trend GDP -14.2a -13.13a 
GDP GAP (DLYSTAR - DLY) -2.74a -4.22a 
DLVEL =change in the log of velocity (LY/LMRES) -6.7a -5.4a 
a=1%, b=5%, c=10% level of significance. *=not significant 
IIIb--The estimated system: The specification of the model is rather eclectic. Inflation rate 
(DLCPI) is a function of rate of changes in the import price level (DLIMP), growth rates of real 
income (DLY), and the rates of changes in the monetary base (DLMRES). Output of goods and 
services, rate of growth in GDP, depends on the inflation rate, lagged government expenditures, 
growth rate of total exports, and rate of growth in the monetary reserves (base).  
We used the Eviews software to estimate the following model. In order to eliminate the 
simultaneity associated with macro-models, we used the two stage least square estimation 
method. We used log of population and three dummy variables for the 1979 revolution, 
introduction of Islamic banking, and the 1973 oil price increase.  
Import prices have a significant positive impact of the inflation rate. The higher import prices 
lead to higher inflation rate. Higher output means less shortage and lower pressure on prices. 
Monetary reserves, of course, have a positive impact on the inflation rate, as one would expect.  
In order to see whether the 1979 Iranian revolution, oil price levels, and the introduction of 
Islamic banking have had some impact on the inflation rates, we included some dummy variables 
in the equations. They, not only were not significant, they made other variables insignificant.  
Estimated Equations 
DLCPI = 0.559 DLIMP - 0.091 DLY 0.263 DLMRES + 0.059 DUMWAR 
t-stat  (3.8)   (-.569) (2.2)   (1.51) 
Adjusted R-Squared = .83 
DW =2.21 
DLY = -.141 + 0.638 DLCPI + 0.555 DLGE(-1) + 0.084 DLEXPO + 0.521 DLMRES 
t-stat (-1.91) (2.59) (2.97) (2.11) (1.55) 
Adjusted R-Squared = .61 
DW =2.023 
Instruments: Log (population), Dumoil, Dumib, Dumrev  
IIIc-- Simulation results:  
 The estimated system was run for two different values of λ (.25, 0.95) in the McCallum's 
response Rule [∆ Bt = ∆ Yt* - ∆ Vta - λ (∆ Yt*- ∆ Yt-1*)]. That is, we assumed that the central 
bank would respond to changes in the real GDP, velocity of money, and the GDP gap with low 
sped (λ =0.25) or high speed (λ =0.95). It is more reasonable to assume high levels of λ to be 
appropriate in this case because of the annual data. In studies that use quarterly data, a lower 
speed of adjustment would be more warranted to prevent undesirable severe shocks to the 
system. McCallum found a value closer to 0.25 to be appropriate for the US economy. The 
following graphs show the simulation results.  
 Graph 1 shows the actual and simulated result of inflation rate. As one would have 
expected, the actual inflation rates are different in a predictable way from the simulation results. 
Since our purpose was to achieve a same level of nominal income at the end of the simulation 
range, simulated inflation rates are higher than the actual rates when actual rates were falling and 
lower than actual inflation rates when they were rising. That is, following a response rule such as 
the McCallum's would stabilize the inflation rates and prevents wide fluctuations similar to the 
historical data. A desirable outcome for monetary policy as well as for economic agents who 
need to make decisions based on the inflation forecast. 
 The 
simulation results for the GDP growth, shown in the graph 2, are also promising. They show a 
lesser fluctuation than the actual growth rates. Again the more aggressive response by the central 
bank (i.e., higher λ ) the smaller is the fluctuations in the GDP growth rate. 
  
 Finally, comparing the historical changes in the monetary base with a policy rule would 
highlight the benefits of a response rule. One could see wider fluctuations in the monetary base 
compare to what was warranted according to the response function. They also show that in most 
of the cases, monetary base moved the opposite of what should have been done according to the 
response function. That is, in most years, they reduced the money supply when they should have 
increased it and increased the money supply when they should have decreased it. At times, its 
seems that they made a wrong monetary policy and the next year, found their mistake and over 
compensated for the mistake by overshooting or undershooting. 
  
IV-- Summery and conclusions 
The history of monetary policy in Iran, judging by their performance in keeping the value of the 
currency, maintaining a steady growth in the Gross Domestic Product, faltering investment, 
show that monetary policy has not been a portrait of consistent successes, to say the least. It has 
been employed in an on-again-off-again manner rather than as a tool 
for 
proactive decision making. If this undesirable tendency (i.e., use of monetary policy to direct or 
redirect short-run ups and downs) were to be overcome, this study shows that we need to 
overhaul the monetary policy making process. That is, we need to undertake three initiatives. 
First and foremost, the central bank must be given independence from all centers of the 
government. It must be given the authority and immunity to make monetary policy. An authority 
and independence similar to those available to the central bankers in the United States, New 
Zealand, and Germany. This would take the central bank out of politics and therefore eliminates 
vacillation in its monetary policy decisions.  
Second, given the limited usefulness of monetary policy in directing and influencing the real 
variables of the economy such as real output of goods and services and employment in the long 
run, the central bank must be directed to strive in achieving the only one objective that it does 
have much control over; price stability. This would allow the central bank to use its resources 
and power in achieving the only thing it can achieve in the best of circumstances.  
Third, the central bank must adhere to a set of explicitly and publicly announced quantitative 
targets for inflation (or nominal income) and also a set of rules designed to achieve those 
quantitative targets. These would go far in cooling the speculative minds of the bazaaris. They 
would know that they no longer could profit from hoarding and speculation about the future 
higher prices. 
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